Perhaps I should give it another try, but Revolutionary Era America has never been high on my list of times in history that intrigue me, nor that I find particularly instructive to our present moment. The extent to which commentators of all political stripes try to harness the Founders for contemporary purposes, or to which modern jurisprudence is grounded in that era, do not, I think, do us many favors in our attempts to construct a just or opportunity-driven society. The more one digs into it, the more the Revolution feels like a sideshow of squabbles among small-colony elites in a far greater drama from which the putative loser of that struggle, the British Empire, rose to an unprecedented position of dominance over the globe that it would hold for the next century-plus.
No, the best way to understand America remains a road trip across it in the here and now, to see all its different corners and glories and complicated stories. The sheer size and scale of this country, even in a digital age, will always render its project somewhat imperial. I don’t use that phrase pejoratively; I just mean that it is going to have to accommodate a ton of different people, and that it will always be hard to govern in a communal, more parliamentary manner. To the extent that history can be a guide I am more drawn to tales of empire: Rome and Byzantium and Britain, and at the more local level I will always cast my lot with the Greeks. But I also think there are limits to the benefits of historical knowledge in a very different world, too.
After 250 years, I will submit that the United States’ triumphs are real. Its political origins were at the front end of a global wave, ideas that then trickled across the pond and southward to Latin America and eventually filtered into institutions we Americans imposed on the world when we supplanted the British for good after World War II. I don’t have a ton of use for hagiography of the US Constitution or political system, but they were achievements for their time. Some aspects have aged well, others less well, but none of them unrescuable, and I will forever acknowledge my incredible good fortune to be born in the time and the place that I was. Much of how we wound up here are products of geography and wealth and the exercise of raw power, but some of it was visionary and shrewd decision-making, sometimes very admirable.
I will not be saying anything new when I claim that the foundations of American exceptionalism are in its engine of growth and hunger, and in the belief in new beginnings inherent in its early colonization. From the conquest of the frontier to space age pursuit to Silicon Valley’s present rush into the virtual future, the US sets a frenetic pace, less constrained by trappings of culture and tradition than anywhere else. The drawbacks of some of these rushes forward are well-documented: the extermination and subjugation of people who already lived on that frontier, the vacuousness of consumer culture, the anti-human profit hunger of some people on the cutting edge of the technological arms race. But to it we owe incredible material wealth and comfort.
Like any great power the United States has behaved venally and exercised its might, sometimes with great consequences. What has made it at times exceptional was the range of its vision, and the humanity with which it pursued some of these goals; the Marshall Plan and some Cold War era artifacts like the Peace Corps and foreign aid played a longer, more careful game, one that understood that careful long-term foundations could produce far more peace and stability than endless crude power politics, at the same time creating new markets for export and isolating geopolitical rivals. These strategies were often self-interested and carried certain excesses, but in the sweep of human history, they are a high point of hegemonic leadership. The great power peace and rampant acceleration out of poverty enjoyed by billions since 1950 are direct products of that vision.
The US is now drifting out of that role. Shortsighted politics is a key part of that story, but like the British in their late imperial phase, American overextension is real, and the long-term fiscal picture makes the same footprint hard to sustain. Trump Era America simultaneously knows this but wants to maintain the illusion, and uses its characteristic spectacle to try to achieve it cheaply, sometimes to dramatic effect (Venezuela) and sometimes disastrously (Iran). But the Biden Administration’s fumbling Afghanistan withdrawal and attempts to say America was back and unchanged on the world stage were much in the same vein. As it enters its next 250 years, the renegotiation of the imperial footprint is one of the two great questions looming over the United States.
I say renegotiation because, for as petty and miserable as its politics have grown, the US colossus looks firm in its absolute position. Europe is comfortable and beautiful but has lapsed backward economically, in need of at least some reinvigoration lest it drift into a senescent old age and see its incredible cultural wealth and diversity fade into mere kitsch. Developed East Asia faces similar pressures, likely even more to the extreme. China is of course the great rising power, theoretically capable of displacing the US with its remarkable trajectory post-Mao, but its demographic time bomb is real and its over-engineered culture runs greater risks than America’s legalistic one; moreover, Chinese civilization’s global pretensions have never matched the totalizing beliefs of the West, to which we Americans are heirs. Russia is an impoverished imperial rump, armed and dangerous but a model to no one. India is interesting, but still has a long way to go. The Middle East, as the Iran War has brought home, remains a bloody basket case, even behind the veneer of Dubaian towers and Saudi scheming. Africa has demographics on its side but little else. Latin America nestles somewhere between all of these worlds, with no claims to much beyond its shores. Someone has got to guide the rule-setting in an anarchic system, and it might as well be us.
There are a few different ways this renegotiation could go. The British, for example, managed a retreat from empire with little loss of their own lives and a national myth largely intact. The impact of that retreat on the nations they left is much less consistent (ask the Indians and Pakistanis about that partition), and we could argue about the extent to which Britain’s increasing ungovernability today is downstream of that imperial fade. But reorientation with dignity is possible, especially when there are allies who understand the stakes and adjust accordingly, as the Americans did with their erstwhile colonialists. Further back in history there are the Habsburgs, brilliant balancers of power for centuries. There is the example of Byzantium, the Roman successor who, while diminished, remained the golden center of the West for another thousand years, and the mythical ideal for Europe for centuries after that. And if things go badly awry there is the model of St. Benedict and the retreat from the worst of a fallen world into intentional communities, there to preserve knowledge and carry something forward on into modernity. I list these examples not as prescriptions, but as pathways of understanding on how things can go.
The second great question facing the United States is one of national identity. The US has done as well as anywhere at integrating a sweeping range of immigrants into a loose national culture, and even haltingly coming to terms with its two great early sins, slavery and the annihilation of Native Nations. In this, the US once again better resembles some empires of old, which had to tolerate a certain level of cultural diversity and decentralization because they were so sprawling and contained so many peoples, and periodically tore down the statues of the old gods and replaced them with new, more useful ones. This stands in stark contrast to the nationalist bloodbaths that consumed Europe between the Napoleonic Era and the Second World War (and in some places beyond), an impulse that turned catastrophically destructive when the hunger for national glory blurred with designs of old-school imperial growth, whether in Napoleonic France or Nazi Germany or Stalin’s Soviet Union. We see a version of this hunger now bubbling on the American right, though lacking obvious pathways outside of niche Greenland fantasies.
The integrationist impulse is under direct attack now from a right that wishes very dearly that the US had a more coherent, rooted sense of self; one that could somehow encompass 350 million people from very different places and of very different origins that somehow also does not settle for the lowest common denominator of 20th century mass culture. It has also taken some blows from a left on a doomed quest to throw out any sense of American history as tainted; a more moderate left couches the US’s role strictly in the realm of noble but somewhat airy ideals, as if rootedness in place and time is an abstraction we can wave away. A few things are simultaneously true: immigration has been a powerful force for American innovation and dynamism, a through-line of new energy. But shared culture is the secret to the success of the strong state (including, and perhaps especially, a welfare state), and beyond a certain level of immigration, there is a regular and extreme backlash that makes such cultural cohesion hard to attain. At the policy level, it requires a balancing act that satisfies few people with strongly held ideas about nationhood or human rights.
Even in an era of optimized algorithms, the US’s size and built-in variety make reproducing a true national culture here a tall order. It is no wonder that American culture so often reduces itself to what can feel like an empty consumerism and commitment to a relentless economic engine: it’s the only thing big enough to bind it all. As a localist who accepts the reality of empire, I do not necessarily mourn this weakness of national unity. It gives us good reason to double down on the more local and tangible, and it lets the rich variety of this country come out. But it does bake in an inherent tension between the rooted hunger for community and the crusading desire for universals baked into the American founding project, twin strands visible anywhere on the political spectrum. The centralizing forces, especially in an increasingly less physical world, threaten to overrun the unique pockets that are at the true heart of the American mythos.
So I once again urge: step out of the imagined community and appreciate the reality on the ground. Immerse yourself; see the great spaces of the West and the immigrant neighborhoods of a global city, the endlessly reinventing metropolises and the struggle for a renewal in an old industrial or agricultural town. Appreciate the commonalities, respect the differences and why they came to be. See us as the empire we are, great and sprawling and flawed. At 250, we are neither a melting pot nor a salad bowl but instead float in a soup. It contains many ingredients all bathed in a general broth, some flavors coming out stronger in certain bites but none coming to dominate the whole meal.
It seems appropriate to see a World Cup played on American shores at time of the Semiquincentennial. Of course the US team’s performance was the same as it ever was, generating irrational hype with victories over such powers as Bosnia and Herzegovina before succumbing when faced with a halfway respectable opponent. (Emphasis on the halfway.) From visa trouble to an overturned red card, the bluntness of American power has been on display. But this is, largely, a pageant that gets past the dumb geopolitics and FIFA corruption. Some of the greatest fun has been in seeing foreigners marvel at such American wonders as air conditioning and Buc-ee’s and parking lots larger than some European micro-states. A love affair grew between Boston and the Scottish masses that descended upon it, and between a Lawrence, Kansas and the Algerians who set up their team camp there. Here is Lionel Messi in an SEC football stadium, uniting the two most rabid fan bases in sports; there is Erling Haaland, the Norwegian cheat code of a striker, trying on a cowboy hat. Amid it all one can still see a sense of how the United States can still be a benevolent hegemon, and of how people from everywhere can find a home here, if only for a little while. The empire’s reach is long, but its touch can still be light.
















































